Recently, Li et al. proposed a dynamic identity based authentication protocol for multiserver architecture. They claimed their protocol is secure and can withstand various attacks. But we found some security loopholes in the protocol. Accordingly, the current paper demonstrates that Li et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the replay attack, the password guessing attack and the masquerade attack.
Introduction
Generally, if a user wants to use numerous different network services, he must register himself to every service providing server. It is extremely hard for users to remember these different identities and passwords. In order to resolve this problem, various multi-server authentication protocols have been proposed.
Recently, Li et al. [1] proposed an authentication protocol for multi-server environments and claimed their protocol could withstand various attacks. In this paper we will show Tsaur et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the password guessing attack and a masquerade attack. 
Li et al.'s protocol
C D E h ⋅ and ( ) h y to the memory of a smart card and issue this smart card to i U .
3) After receiving the smart card, i U inputs b into it and finishes the registration.
Login phase
Once the user i U wants to login to the server j S , he will perform the following login steps.
1) The user i U inputs his identity i ID and the password i P into the terminal. The smart card computes ( || )
Then the smart card checks whether i C and i C′ are equal. If they are not equal, the smart card stops the session.
2) The smart card generates a random number
At last, the smart card Finally, the user i U , the server j S and the control server CS agree on a common session key as 
Weaknesses of Li et al.'s protocol

Password Guessing Attack
Kocher et al. [2] and Messerges et al. [3] have pointed out that all existent smart cards are vulnerable in that the confidential information stored in the device could be extracted by physically monitoring its power consumption; once a card is lost, all secrets in it may be revealed. To evaluate the security of smart card based 5 user authentication, we assume the capabilities that an adversary A may have as follows:
1) The adversary has total control over the communication channel between the users and the server in the login and authentication phases. That is, A may intercept, insert, delete, or modify any message in the channel.
2) A may (i) either steal a user's smart card and then extract the information from it, (ii) or obtain a user's password, (iii) but not both (i) and (ii).
Suppose an adversary A has stolen i U 's smart card and extracted the stored values , , , ( ) 2) A computes ( || )
3) A checks whether i C′ and i C are equal. If they are equal, A finds the correct password. Otherwise, A repeats 1)-3) until finding the correct password.
From the above description, we know the adversary can get the password.
Therefore, Li et al.'s protocol is vulnerable to the password guessing attack.
Masquerade Attack
Let t U is a malicious user. Then he will get his secure key , , , ( ) 
Replay Attack
The adversary A has total control over the communication channel between the users and the server in the login and authentication phases. That is,
A may intercept, insert, delete, or modify any message in the channel.
A could intercept a legal message 1 
Conclusion
Recently, Li et al. proposed an authentication protocol for multi-server environments and demonstrated its immunity against various attacks. However, after review of their protocol and analysis of its security, three kinds of weaknesses are presented in different scenarios. The analyses show that the protocol is insecure for practical application.
